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ABSTRACT
Until the 1980s the outstanding indebtedness of' government and
private—sector borrowers in the United States exhibited sufficient negative
covariatiori that total outstanding debt remained steady relative to
nonfinancial economic activity. Three hypotheses ——onebased on lenders'
behavior, one on borrowers' behavior, and one on credit market institutional
arrangements —-providepotential explanations for this phenomenon. Since 1980
the U.S. debt markets have departed from these previously prevailing patterns,
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The emergence during the l980s of persistent U.S. Government budget
deficits on a scale unprecedented in the nation's prior peacetime experience,
coupled with a strong increase in borrowing both by businesses and by
individual Americans, has focused renewed attention on the long—standing
question of what relationship (if any) connects the economy's public— and
private—sector indebtedness.
This unusual set of developments raises scientific questions as well as
questions of public policy. The most widely discussed issue at the policy
level has been the concern that so large a federal deficit, persisting even at
near—full employment, is impairing the economy's long—run growth and
competitiveness by absorbing so much saving as to "crowd out" investment in
productive new plant and equipment. The private sector's mounting indebtedness
has also raised concerns of financial fragility, in that business and
individual borrowers may not be able to meet their obligations in the event of
disappointing growth in their cash flows.
At a more fundamental level, this departure from previously prevailing
regularities offers an opportunity to gain new perspectives on the underlying
behavior of borrowers and lenders. Economics, after all, is not a laboratory—2—
science. Controlled experiments are impossible at the macroeconomic level, and
the data available for empirical analysis, generated as they are by the complex
interaction of market dynamics, government policies, and external shocks, too
often exhibit insufficient variation to unravel the diverse causal forces at
work. Observed outcomes exhibiting variation well outside the range of prior
experience present new opportunities as well as new challenges.
Until the 1980s, a long—standing regularity characterizing the U.S. debt
markets was that public— and private—sector borrowing exhibited sufficient
negative covariation over time, both cyclically and secularly, that the
combined indebtedness of all borrowers remained roughly steady in relation to
U.S. nonfinancial economic activity. Yet there is no a priori reason why
public and private debt need covary negatively, or why total debt outstanding
need be constant in relation to income. Why then did these relationships
obtain for so long? Did they reflect the behavior of borrowers, or lenders?
Or both? What implications do plausible hypotheses about borrowers' or
lenders' behavior in this context bear for other unsettled questions about
economic behavior, or for policy issues like how government deficits affect
private capital formation, or what level of private—sector indebtedness would
threaten the economy's financial stability?
The sharp departure from prior relationships exhibited by the U.S. debt
markets since 1980 should now make it easier to answer questions like these.
Given economists' limited opportunities to observe the phenomena they study,
explanations for change are more accessible and more readily testable than
explanations for invariance. If so major a feature of the U.S. financial
system has now changed so markedly, then something else ——plausiblyrelated to
financial outcomes through understandable representations of economic behavior—3—
——musthave changed as well. Establishing the central connections involved,
and exploring their implications for other behavioral and policy questions, isa
research challenge of substantial importance. In economics as in other
disciplines, diagnosis must precede prescription.
Public and Private Debt Before the 1980s
Figure 1 illustrates the stable pre—1980 relationship between debt and
economic activity by plotting the yearend credit market indebtedness of all
U.S. obligors other than financial intermediaries, expressed as a percentage of
fourth—quarter gross national product (seasonably adjusted), since the end of
the Korean War.(1) During 1953—1980 the economy's total debt ratio
fluctuated narrowly, with mean 137.1% (that is, just over $1.37 of debt for
every $1 of GNP), standard deviation 2.9%, high 1112.8% (in 19611), and low
131.5% (in 1956). What little fluctuation occurred mostly followed the
business cycle, with the debt ratio typically rising a point or two in
recession years (when GNP, in the denominator, was below trend) and falling
back during expansions. There is no evidence of any time trend.
This stability In the total debt ratio stands in contrast to the variation
of the five underlying sector components shown in Figure 1, which exhibited
substantial variation throughout this period. In brief, the secular post—war
rise in private debt outstanding largely mirrored a major decline (relative to
GNP) in public debt, while cyclical bulges in public debt issuance (mostly due
to recession—induced shortfalls of tax revenues) had their counterpart in
recessionary reductions in private borrowing. (2)
Figure2 provides a broader historical perspective by plotting similar
data beginning with the l920s. Forthis longer sample as well,there is no
evidenceof any time trend in the total debt ratio. The 1921—30 mean of 133.2%
differs only marginally from the mean of 137.0% for 1971-80. Over these six—1$—
decades the ratio rose significantly only during the depression years 1931—35,
when GNP had declined sharply and much of the private—sector debt on record had
defaulted de facto.(3) By comparison, World War II appears as only a minor
episode from this perspective, since the enormous wartime bulge in federal debt
was largely offset by a sharp decline in the relative indebtedness of borrowers
in the economy's private sector.
What makes this stability of the total debt ratio especially striking is
that it did not represent merely a sum of individually stable parts. The
indebtedness of specific borrowing sectors exhibited substantial fluctuation,
but typically in a sufficiently offsetting way that the total debt ratio stayed
close to the norm of about 135%. In short, the respective sectors' debt ratios
jointly exhibited substantial negative covariation over time.
The dimension of this negative oovariation that bears most directly on key
questions of economic behavior and public policy is that between public— and
private—sector debt. Table 1 summarizes this comovenient by showing simple
correlation coefficients relating the federal government's debt ratio to
several different measures of the private sector's debt ratio, again based on
yearend data. The evidence of negative covariation persists for 1921—80 as a
whole and for several different subperiods (including one omitting the
depression years), thereby indicating that the offsetting behavior of public
and private debt before the 1980s was not due merely to a few outlier
observations. Regression analysis, allowing for time trends and other factors
like the use of GNP to scale the data, also show similar evidence.
ThrDotheses Exolainin the Stable Debt Ratio
There is no known reason, based on strictly a priori grounds, why an






































































































































































































































































































relationship to its level of output or income. Especially in an economy like
that of the United States, both businesses and individuals can finance their
activities in a rich variety of ways. In choosing whether to use their own or
borrowed funds, and in the case of businesses whether to raise debt or equity,
they presumably take into account not only market yield relationships but also
considerations like credit availability, tax rates, economy—wide risk levels,
bankruptcy arrangements, and so on. Many of these basic determinants of
private borrowing decisions have undergone major change over the course of this
century, and even just within the post—war period. Government at all levels
also typically has broad latitude to spend much or little in relation to
economic activity, and to finance that spending through varying combinations of
taxing and borrowing. The regularity highlighted in Figures 1 and 2 is the
more striking in that neither government nor private—sector borrowers make the
decisions that determine their outstanding debt in a way that would necessarily
impose any constancy in the relationship of' their combined debt to GNP, or that
would necessarily enforce a negative covariation between public and private
debt outstanding.
For every borrower, of course, there must be a lender. Throughout most of
this century ——again,until the 1980s ——theUnited States ran an
approximately balanced current account in its international economic relations,
so that the funds supplied to the U.S. markets by foreign investors just about
balanced the funds supplied abroad by U.S. investors.1 Hence the total
borrowing done by U.S. borrowers approximately equalled the total lending done
by U.S. lenders, so that the steady relationship to GNP exhibited by total debt
owed was also characteristic of total debt held. Just as in the case of'
borrowers, however, there is no a priori reason why an economy's lenders need




































































































































































































































































SIMPLE CORRELATIONS OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE DEBT RATIOS. 1921—1980
SamDle
Private Sectors Included 1921—80 1921—SO. 196—80 1921—52 195—8O
All Non—federal —.71 —.91 —.71 —.98
Business Plus Household —.75 -.93 —.75 —.98
Business Only —.52 —.66 —.77 —.98
Household Only —.k7 —.38 —.92—6—
assets bear any specific relation to the economy's output or income.
Not only is there no a priori reason to account for the negative
comovement of public and private debt that underlay the U.S. economy's stable
total debt ratio over so many years, but international comparisons indicate
that other developed economies around the world have not exhibited so strong a
regularity over time in this regard. Some behavioral factor ——ormore
than one ——musttherefore have been at work to bring about this phenomenon in
the United States. Because of the U.S. economy's roughly balanced foreign
position over many years, and hence the approximate equality between total debt
owed and total debt held, whatever was responsible could have worked through
the behavior of either borrowers or lenders, or both. Distinguishing among the
several competing explanations for these phenomena is especially important in
that different hypotheses carry different implications for major public policy
issues like the effects of large government deficits and the risks of higher
levels of private—sector debt.
A }fvoothesis About Lenders' Behavior. The most straightforward available
explanation for the U.S. economy's stable total debt ratio ——andhence for the
negative covariation between public and private debt, given any source of
independent fluctuation in either -—emergeson the addition of some strong
assumptions about the substitutability of various categories of assets to
standard economic representations of portfolio behavior. At least in
principle, these assumptions, and hence the hypothesis to which they give rise,
are empirically testable. The central question at issue is whether investors
treat debt and other assets as close or distant substitutes in their
portfolios.
The starting point for the construction of' an applicable hypothesis about
lenders' behavior is a familiar implication of Modigliani's "life cycle"—7—
hypothesis of saving: In a mature (albeit growing) economy with a stable
population age distribution, individuals will save out of their incomes in such
a way that the economy's aggregate accumulated wealth remains stable in
relation to aggregate income.6 Although the U.S. population's age
structure has varied during this century, most notably with the post World War
II "baby boom," the U.S. economy's aggregate wealth—to—income ratio has hovered
near three—to—one for manydecades. Given this stable wealth—to—income
ratio, a stable debt—to—income ratio is equivalent to a stable share of debt
assets in the economy's aggregate wealth portfolio.
According to the standard theory of risk—averse portfolio behavior,
investors allocate their portfolios to maximize expected return while
minimizing risk. If two or more assets expose investors to similar risks, then
investors will regard them as close substitutes and will simply choose
whichever bears the greatest expected return. Stability in the portfolio
shares allocated to assets that are close substitutes would therefore occur
only if these assets' respective expected returns were always approximately
equal, and even then only by chance.
By contrast, if two or more assets expose investors to highly disparate
risks, then investors will regard them as only weak substitutes (or not as
substitutes at all) and will prefer to hold such assets in whatever respective
proportions reduce their overall risk posture. As long as investors are at
least moderately risk—averse ——asthe available evidence indicates ——
stabilityin the portfolio shares allocated to assets that are no more than
weak substitutes would occur even if these assets' respective expected returns
varied widely relative to one another over time.
Expected asset returns are not observable, but realized returns are.
Given the large systematic variation observed over time in the respective—8—
returns on different classes of assets in the United States (and in other
countries too), it is implausible to suppose that investors' expectations of
these returns do not fluctuate relative to one another also. In that case,
investors would hold different kinds of assets in roughly constant portfolio
shares only if they regarded those assets as at best weak substitutes. More
specifically, if investors regard debt securities as weak substitutes for other
assets, including equities as well as real estate and tangibles, then over time
they will allocate a stable share of their portfolios to holding debt, despite
sometimes even wide variations in expected debt returns relative to expected
returns on other assets. Given the economy's stable aggregate wealth—to—income
ratio, the resulting stability of the share of total wealth that Investors
devote to holding debt assets will in turn imply a stable aggregate
debt—to-income ratio.
Since the aggregate of debt held equals the aggregate of debt Issued, the
resulting stable ratio of total lending to income implies a stable ratio of
total borrowing to income. The market mechanism that translates the stable
ratio for debt held into a stable ratio for debt owed Is just the movement of
Interest rates necessary to equate total demand and total supply in the debt
market. A bulge in supply by any one borrower leads to higher Interest rates,
because of lenders' limited willingness to hold debt, and so causes other
interest—sensitive borrowers to reduce their supply. Hence there will be
negative coinovements over time among the debt ratios of individual borrowing
sectors if any one or more sectors behave Independently in this regard ——for
example, if wartime defense spending increases government borrowing, or a
demographically driven surge of hoinebuilding Increases individuals' borrowing.
Is it plausible to suppose that U.S. investors, on average, treat debt
securities as at best only weak substitutes for other assets? To the extent—9—
that the variation over time of realized asset returns exhibits a combination
of systematic and unsystematic components, and that investors treat observed
experience as at least a partial guide to the probabilities associated with
future returns, data on realized returns admit inferences about perceived asset
risk structures and hence, via standard portfolio theory, imply asset
substitutabilities. Figure 3 shows the annual record of after—tax
after—inflation returns during 1953—85 on three major classes of financial
assets in the United States: short—term debt, long—term debt, and
equities.8 These returns are clearly positively correlated. (The simple
correlation coefficients are .5I between short— and long—term debt, .50 between
short—term debt and equity, and .53 between long—term debt and equity.) What
matters for portfolio behavior is not realized returns and the associated
variances and covariances, however,but expected returns and the risk
perceptions associated with them. Before drawing inferences about asset
substitutabilities, it is therefore necessary to separate out the expected and
unexpected components in these series. The results of such empirical efforts
to date, mostly based on data excluding the l980s, have beenmixed.' It is
too early to judge how the introduction of new data, incorporating sharp
departures from prior relationships, will affect future analyses conducted
along these lines.
A Hypothesis About Borrowers? Behavior. An alternative explanation for
the pre—1980s stable total debt ratio and associated negative public—private
debt covariation focuses on the behavior of borrowers. The central assumptions
required for this hypothesis pertain to borrowers' perceptions, as well as to
their willingness to incur risk. Once again, at least in principle these
assumptions are testable.



























































































































































assumptions that borrowers are averse to the risks inherent in owing money,
and that they gauge these risks at least in part according to the relationship
between their outstanding debt and their incomes. Debt default and
bankruptcy typically involve costs to borrowers as well as lenders, usually
involving the borrower's loss of control over either personal or business
assets and consequent inability in many cases to proceed with ongoing affairs
in a normal fashion (often with resulting human dislocations and loss of
built—up intangible capital). Gauging the risk of indebtedness in relation to
income is also a familiar idea, although it is not without potential
drawbacks. For example, most debts do not require repayment in full on demand
but obligate the borrower to meet a specific schedule of payments including
interest and principal. Hence debt service requirements can vary in relation
to income, even if debt owed remains steady, if interest rate levels change or
if the debt's average term to maturity changes. In addition, for given debt
the probability of default is the greater the more uncertain is the borrower's
cash flow and value of liquidatable assets. Hence the assumption that
borrowers assess their debt risk by comparing outstanding debt to income can at
best be only approximately true.
More importantly, by themselves the assumptions that borrowers seek to
avoid default risk and that they measure default risk in this way imply a
stable debt—to—income ratio not for the economy in total but for each borrower
separately. Even after aggregation to allow for the shifting circumstances
confronting different businesses and individuals, and for the fact that
individuals own the businesses, this pair of assumptions implies a stable debt
ratio for the economy's private sector as a whole, but not for the total debt
ratio including the private sector plus the government. Some further
assumption ——somedirect link between the economyts public and private sectors—11—
——isneeded to imply systematic negative covariation between public— and
private—sector debt, and hence a stable total debt ratio.(11)
The specific assumption along these lines advanced by Barro and others is
that individuals not only treat as their own debt the liabilities issued by the
businesses they own but also "see through the shell" of government.(12) If
individuals recognize that their tax payments are the sole source of revenue
backing the government's debt, then more government debt outstanding means
larger government debt service obligations, and hence higher tax payments.
After passing through the filter of the tax system, therefore, government debt
is really private debt. Given this additional assumption, the hypothesis that
borrowers in general seek to maintain a steady debt risk level as measured by
outstanding debt relative to income does imply a stable economy—wide total debt
ratio, and hence negative covariation between public debt and private debt in
the presence of independent variation in either.
Is the assumption that individuals treat government debt as equivalent to
their own plausible? Because individuals' attitudes toward government debt
service obligations are difficult to measure directly, empirical testing of
this proposition to date has been indirect, focusing on two of its chief
impuoations.13 One is the implication that government borrowing should
not affect interest rates (or asset returns and prices more generally). Not
surprisingly, in light of the many forces impinging on interest rate
determination, investigation of this proposition has again led to conflicting
(lit) results. Figure It plots the after—inflation interest rate on U.S.
Treasury bills against two potentially relevant measures of federal government
debt and deficits for 1955—85: the change in the federal debt ratio, as
plotted in Figure 1; and the ratio of the federal budget deficit to GNP, with











































































































































































interest rate series is positively related to both of these federal borrowing
measures (with simple correlation coefficients .37 and .35, respectively),
thereby casting some doubt on the "public debt is private debt" assumption.
The positive relationship is even stronger in the second half of the sample.
Even so, there is clearly range for differences of interpretation, especially
in the context of efforts to control for additional causal influences.
The other implication of the "public debt is private debt" assumption on
which empirical research has focused is the proposition that individuals,
either directly or via the businesses they own, increase their saving to offset
government deficits so that the economy's total saving rate is more stable than
that of the private sector alone. Here the evidence is more straightforwardly
negative. Figure 5 plots the net saving of the economy's private sector
(including individuals, businesses, and state and local governments), the
federal government's surplus, and theresultingeconomy—wide total net saving
——allstated as percentages of GNP ——forl955_85.(16) There is little here
to support the idea that private saving fluctuates so as to insulate total
saving from variations in the federal budget position. During the 1980s, for
example, the private saving rate actually declined slightly in the face of
record—size government deficits. For the sample as a whole, the private saving
and federal surplus measures are not significantly correlated (correlation
coefficient —.02), so that the economy's total saving does covary strongly and
positively with the federal surplus (correlation coefficient .89).
A Hvoothesis About Market ImDerfections. Finally, a third potential
explanation for the stable U.S. total debt ratio places primary emphasis on
neither borrowers nor lenders but on the market setting in which they interact,
including in particular the asymmetry of information distinguishing borrowers









































































































































































































































intentions and prospects than potential lenders can possibly know.
As a result of this asymmetry, in conjunction with standard legal
procedures governing defaults, lenders face a problem of adverse selection. At
any given interest rate, borrowers whose probability of default is higher are
more likely to seek to borrow than are those with greater likelihood of meeting
their obligations. Moreover, raising the interest rate to compensate for this
enhanced probability of default will only further discourage low—risk borrowers
in comparison to high—risk ones. Hence lenders not only seek information to
distinguish one would—be borrower from another ("credit analysis") but also
discriminate by granting credIt to some but not to others even when all are
willing to accept the same terms ("credit rationing").
A further way for lenders to protect against default risk is by requiring
collateral ——thatis, the pledging of assets to be forfeited by the borrower
in the event of default. Collateral not only limits the lender's potential
loss should a default occur, but can also provide an effective way of
discriminating low—risk from high—risk borrowers. Various collateral
arrangements have long been typical of many debt markets, both in the United
States and elsewhere.
The crucial role played by collateral requirements in explaining a stable
debt—to—income ratio is that they provide a link between assets held and the
ability to borrow. Not only is the U.S. economy's aggregate wealth relatively
stable in relation to aggregate income, but most of this wealth consists of
business assets (plant, equipment and inventories) and personal assets (mostly
houses and consumer durables) which can and do serve as collateral in private
loan arrangements. If the ability to borrow depends in part on the ownership
of assets that can serve as collateral, and the total of such assets is stable
in relation to income, then the debt of at least the private sector will also—1 il
bestable in relation to income. If, in addition, individuals do regard
government debt as equivalent to their own (in contrast to the assumption made
above), then they will regard the government debt that they hold as part of
their net wealth. If total wealth is stable in relation to income, therefore,
over time they will adjust their accumulation of other assets so as to offset
fluctuations in their holdings of government debt. As a result, the private
sector's ability to provide collateral, and hence to borrow, will also covary
negatively with the outstanding government debt.17
The empIrical importance of collateral requirements is straightforward
enough. Borrowing against tangible assets In the form of home mortgage and
consumer installment credit has traditionally constituted 80—90% of all debt
owed by Individuals In the United States. Commercial mortgages, inventory
financing and other forms of secured credit also account for a major share of
business debt. The chief question mark, once again, lies in the assumption
about how individuals (and businesses) react to the issuance of government
debt.
Is it plausible to assume that increased holdings of government debt
directly reduce the accumulation of wealth in otherforms?18 Figure 6
plots aggregate U.S. net investment in residential and nonresidential capital,
respectively ——bothstated as percentages of GNP ——againstthe two measures
of government borrowing introduced in Figure 1,for1955—85. Each form of
investment exhibits significant negative covariation with both measures of
government borrowing. (For net residential investment, the simple correlations
with the change in the federal debt ratio and the high—employment deficit ratio
are _.71$ and —.77, respectively; the corresponding correlations for
nonresidential investment are _.8Z and —.62, respectively.) Here, however,























































































basic conceptions of how government borrowing plausibly affects private capital
formation crucially depend on whether the economy is or is not at full
employment. Hence distinguishing effects of government borrowing from effects
due to the business cycle is essential in this context, despite the
complication that stems from the cyclical character of government borrowing
itself.
Public and Private Debt Since 1980
At yearend 1980 the U.S. economy's total debt ratio stood at 137.7%, well
within one standard deviation of the 1953—80 mean. By yearend 1985 the debt
ratio was 169.2%, more than eleven standard deviations higher, and above any
prior U.S. debt level recorded in this century except for 1931—35. As Table 2
shows, all major classes of U.S. nonfinancial borrowers except farmers
participated in this increased indebtedness since 1980. In particular, the
negative covariation between public— and private—sector debt that had
characterized prior decades' experience disappeared. The data indicate a
statistically significant break at 1980 in each of the four correlations
reported in Table 1, with 1981—85 values not just positive but uniformly in
excess of .90.
The experience of different categories of borrowers in the U.S. debt
markets has varied markedly during this period. After only modest variation in
their indebtedness relative to ON? between 1960 and 1975, U.S. households
sharply increased their debt position in the late l970s and again in the early
l980s. During the late 1970s home mortgage borrowing accounted for
substantially all of the increased household indebtedness, but during the early
1980s all forms of household indebtedness rose, including home inortages and
especially consumer credit. At the same time, rising prices of real estate inTABLE 2
INCREASE IN THE U.S. DEBT RATIO. 1980—1985
Debt Ratio
Borrower 1980 1985 Chance
Households 50.9% 58.5% +7.6%
Businesses 50.3 57.9 +7.4
Corporations 32.1 36.8 +
Farms 5.6 14.1 — 1.2
Other 12.6 16.6 +11.0
State—Local Governments 10.11 13.3 +2.9
Federal Government 26.1 39.14 +13,11
All Nonfinancial Borrowers 137.7% 169.2% +31.5%—16—
the1970s and of equity securities in the l980s increased holdings of both
nonfinancial and finanacial assets during this period, so that household net
worth showed little change relative to GNP despite the sharply higher debt.
By contrast, as of yearend 1985 the U.S. corporate sector's financial and
tangible assets both stood at approximately the same point in relation to GNP
as they did in 1975 or 1980. Hence there are no additional assets behind the
new accumulation of corporate debt, which has resulted simply from
debt—for—equity exchanges on the other side of the corporate sector's balance
sheet. In l981_85 alone, mergers, acquisitions, leveraged buyouts and other
corporate reorganizations resulted in net retirement of $156 billion of equity.
Amongnon—corporatebusinesses, the experience has been mixed. Between
1980 and 1985 the U.S. farm sector actually reduced its indebtedness relative
to GNP. By contrast, borrowing by other non—corporate businesses raised the
total debt ratio by almost as much as corporate borrowing despite a far smaller
initial non—corporate debt level. This rise in non—farm non—corporate business
indebtedness, however, was consistent with earlier trends. Almost all of these
businesses' increased debt has been in the form of mortgage financing, and it
has taken place against even more substantially enlarged holdings of tangible
assets (mostly land and residential real estate, but also including some
business plant and equipment), so that the aggregate net worth of non—farm
non—corporatebusiness sector modestly increasedduring 1980—85.
Theremainingportion of the large 1980—85 increase in the U.S. economy's
total debt ratio not due to the federal government has reflected increased
indebtedness of state and local governments. This development represented a
sharp reversal of the trend that had prevailed since the late 1960s. More than
all of this increased debt has reflected a form of financial intermediation by
state and local governments, as these authorities have borrowed, in—17—
anticipation of potential restrictions on their ability to issue tax—exempt
securities, to fund many of their needs in advance and then, for the time
being, simply re—invested the proceeds.
Finally, nearly one—half of the post—1980 rise in the U.S. economy's total
debt ratio has consisted of increased indebtedness of the federal government.
The steady, unbroken growth of the U.S. Government's outstanding debt between
1980 and 1985, despite a major business expansion during 1983—85, is clearly
the element of the overall debt ratio rise that is most out of character with
prior U.S. historical experience, not just since World War II but throughout
the nation's existence. Until the l980s, significant sustained increases in
federal government debt relative to GNP took place only during wartime. The
contrary pattern, which has resulted in large part from the record—size tax
reductions legislated in 1981, stands as the hallmark of post—1980 fiscal
policy.
In sum, the two underlying factors behind the post—1980 debt ratio
increase that seem most out of character with prior U.S. experience are the
dramatic change in the federal government's fiscal policy and, with distinctly
less importance, the corporate reorganization movement. At a more fundamental
level, however, what has been absent in the l980s to date is the long—standing
negative oovariation among the debt-issuing behavior of public— and
private—sector borrowers, Bulges in the debt of one borrowing sector or
another have occurred before, but in the past they have been approximately
offset by reductions (at least relative to GNP) in the debt of others. The
experience of the early 1980s has sharply departed from that historical
pattern.—18—
Concluding Comments
The breakdown of a long—standing but little understood regularity in
observed behavior presents puzzles but also provides opportunities. Data
incorporating hitherto unseen variation can be invaluable in resolving
questions not just about why behavior has shifted but about what stood behind
the initial regularity in the first place. The sharply changed relationship
since 1980 between total debt and income in the U.S. economy ——and,within the
total, between the respective debt of the economy's public and private sectors
——presentssuch a puzzle, and correspondingly provides an opportunity. At
lease three fundamentally different hypotheses about economic behavior could,
in principle, have accounted for the pre—1980's stability of the debt—to—income
relationship. Empirical analysis incorporating the more recent experience may
now facilitate distinguishing which one (if any) in fact describes the working
of the U.S. debt market.
Distinguishing among these competing explanations is also important
because the different hypotheses carry sharply different implications for major
issues of public policy. Does the continuing large federal government deficit
impair the economy's ability to undertake productive capital formation? The
answer is yes under the hypothesis based on lenders' behavior, no under that
based on borrowers' behavior, and again yes under that based on market
imperfections. Does the increased indebtedness of private borrowers
potentially threaten the economy's financial stability? The answer is yes
under the hypothesis based on lenders' behavior, no under that based on
borrowers' behavior, and again no under that based on market imperfections.
Finding the right explanation for the observed relationship between debt and
income, and between public debt and private debt, would be a good start on
deciding how to approach either of these current issues.—19—
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